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Redefining Objectivity : 
The Case for the Reasonable Woman Standard 
in Hostile Environment Claims 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 
When Kerry Ellison began receiving "love notes" from her 
co-worker, Sterling Gray, she was convinced she was the target 
of sexual harassment.' Mr. Gray, on the other hand, likely had 
no idea his "romantic" gestures would be interpreted as harass- 
ment. Such inconsistency in interpretation is typical because 
women tend to perceive sexual or gender-based conduct in the 
workplace quite differently than men? What male workers 
consider harmless, females might consider frightening; conduct 
that some men see as flirtation or chivalry might be interpret- 
ed by some women as an  intimidating precursor to bold- 
er-possibly violent+o~ertures.~ In a Title VII sexual harass- 
ment case, the trier of fact must contend with this discrepancy 
when determining whether certain conduct does, indeed, consti- 
tute harassment. Courts must choose, therefore, whether to 
evaluate the conduct from the perspective of a reasonable male, 
a reasonable female, or a reasonable gender-neutral "person." 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
suggests that courts scrutinize the offending conduct through 
the eyes of an  objective, reasonable p e r ~ o n . ~  The Ninth Circuit, 
however, recently concluded in  Ellison v. grady5 that the rea- 
sonable person standard "tends to be male-biased and [to] sys- 
1. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1991); see also infia notes 
6 1-68 and accompanying text. 
2. See David E. Terpstra & Douglas D. Baker, Sexual Harassment at  Work: 
The Psychosocial Issues, in VULNERABLE WORKERS: PSYCHOSOCIAL AND LEGAL IS- 
SUES 186 (Marilyn J. Davidson & Jill Earnshaw eds., 1991); see also infia text 
accompanying notes 76-93. 
3. See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 880-82; see also Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrim- 
ination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1205 
(1989). 
4. EEOC: P o l e  Guidance on Sexual Harassment, [8 Fair Emp. Prac. Man.] 
Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) $ 405:6681 (1990) [hereinafter EEOC Policy Guidance]. The 
emphasis in this EEOC instruction is arguably on objectivity rather than gender 
neutrality. See infra notes 69-75 and accompanying text. 
5. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). 
364 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993 
tematically ignore the experiences of women."6 Accordingly, 
the court held that the proper standard should be to view the 
conduct from the perspective of a reasonable person of the 
victim's gender.' 
This comment examines the judicial standards currently 
employed in determining whether workplace conduct consti- 
tutes "sexual harassment." Part I1 analyzes the history and 
background of Title VII sexual harassment claims. Part I11 ex- 
amines the ineffectiveness of the gender-neutral "reasonable 
person" standard and the development and potential impact of 
the reasonable woman standard? Part IV concludes that adop- 
tion of the reasonable woman standard more fully achieves the 
purposes of Title VII by better protecting female employees, 
reducing sexual harassment, and ensuring an objective, fair 
standard upon which employers and employees can rely. 
11. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT 
OF TITLE VII SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS 
A. Title VII: Promulgation without Guidance 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employ- 
ers from "discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect 
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ- 
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin."9 The word "sex" was not added to the statute 
6. Id. at 879. 
7. To set out a hostile environment claim under Ellison, a female plaintiff 
must establish that the alleged conduct would offend a reasonable woman. Id. 
Judges and writers have been stridently calling for this standard for some time. 
The most notable example is the dissent in Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 
611, 625 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also 
Susan M. Mathews, Title VII and Sexual Harassment: Beyond Damages Control, 3 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 299 (1991); Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive 
Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 WV. L. REV. 1449 (1984); Barbara L. 
Zalucki, Comment, Discrimination Law-Defining the Hostile Work Environment 
Claim of Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 11 1. NEW ENG. L. REV. 143 (1989). 
8. I t  is important to note that the reasonable woman standard does not slight 
male victims of sexual harassment. Rather, the Ellison court clarifies that if the 
victim were a male, the proper standard would be the perspective of a reasonable 
male. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879. In other words, the reasonable woman standard, in 
a broader sense, is really the reasonable victim standard, and the Ellison court, as 
well as this comment, uses the terms interchangeably. See id. at 880; cf. infia 
text accompanying notes 112-113. Because most victims of sexual harassment are 
women, however, characterizing the standard as that of the "reasonable woman" 
seems more appropriate. 
9. 42 U.S.C. 3 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988) (emphasis added). 
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until the "last minute"; consequently, legislative direction is 
scant.'' The EEOC and the federal courts have been left to in- 
terpret exactly what Congress intended by including that word. 
Initially, courts found a violation of Title VII when an employer 
denied an individual some benefit of employment solely be- 
cause of gender." However, the courts and the EEOC quickly 
broadened Title W to also prohibit "sexual harassment" in the 
workplace. 
B. Further Clarification: The EEOC and the Courts 
In 1971, the Fifth Circuit stated, 'We must be acutely con- 
scious of the fact that Title VII . , . should be accorded a liberal 
interpretation in order to  effectuate the purpose of Congress to 
eliminate the inconvenience, unfairness, and humiliation of. . . 
dis~rimination."'~ This advice prompted other courts t o  "liber- 
ally interpret'' Title VII to prohibit sexual harassment in the 
workplace because such conduct is inherently discriminatory. 
As currently interpreted, Title VII prohibits two types of 
sexual harassment: quid pro and hostile environment. 
The former occurs when an employer conditions employment 
benefits on the granting of sexual favors.14 The latter, which 
is the focus of this paper, occurs when an employee is subjected 
to  an "offensive or abusive" working environment.15 In 1980, 
the EEOC promulgated its Guidelines on Discrimination Be- 
cause of Sex,16 which offered definitions of sexual harassment 
to  help courts and employers know what types of conduct 
would violate Title VII." The Guidelines point out that al- 
10. See Ellison, 924 F.2d a t  875 (citing 110 CONG. REC. 2577-84 (1964)). 
11. See, e.g., Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974). 
12. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (emphasis added), cert. 
denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). 
13. The term quid pro quo literally means "something for something." BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1248 (6th ed. 1990). 
14. Sexual Harassment Policy Guide, [8 Fair Emp. Prac. Man.] Lab. Rel. Rep. 
(BNA) 8 421:453-54 (1992) [hereinafter Policy Guide]; see also Williams v. Saxbe, 
413 F. Supp. 654, 662-63 (D.D.C. 1976) (holding that an employee's termination 
after refusal to submit to her supervisor's sexual demands violated Title VII as 
quid pro quo harassment). 
15. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 1991). This definition will be 
further refined within this comment. The reasonable woman standard sprang up 
amidst the confusion generated by the question of what, exactly, constitutes a 
"hostile environment." 
16. 29 C.F.R. 8 1604 (1992) [hereinafter Guidelines]. 
17. The Guidelines state: 
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal 
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though not all gender-based conduct at work is proscribed by 
Title VII, it "crosses the line" into harassment if it is "unwel- 
come sexual . . . conduct [that has become] . . . a term or condi- 
tion of. . . employment."18 Others have suggested alternative 
definitions,'' but generally conduct must be unwelcome to 
qualify as harassing. The Guidelines further define a hostile 
environment as a workplace where such unwelcome sexual 
conduct "has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering 
with an individual's work performance or creating an intimi- 
dating, hostile, or offensive working en~ironment."~~ For ex- 
ample, unwelcome touching, joking, gestures, and comments, as 
well as offensive pictures, literature, or graffiti, can create a 
hostile en~ironment.~~ The plaintiff need not suffer economic 
harm t o  sustain a claim against the employer for creating or 
allowing such an environment.'' 
or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when 
(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a 
term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or re- 
jection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employ- 
ment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the pur- 
pose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work perfor- 
mance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environ- A 
ment . 
Id. § 1604.11(a). 
18. Id. (emphasis added); see also Policy Guzde, supm note 14, 8 421:452. 
19. For example, Catharine MacKinnon suggested that 
sexual harassment . . . refers to the unwanted imposition of sexual re- 
quirements in the context of a relationship of unequal power. Central to 
the concept is the use of power derived from one social sphere to lever 
benefits or impose deprivations in another . . . . When one is sexual, the 
other material, the cumulative sanction is particularly potent. 
CATHARINE A. MACKTNNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 1 (1979) 
(emphasis added). The Working Women's Institute defines harassment as "any 
repeated or unwanted verbal or physical sexual advances; sexually explicit deroga- 
tory statements; or sexually discriminatory remarks made by someone in the 
workplace which are offensive or objectionable to the recipient, or cause the recipi- 
ent discomfort or humiliation, or interfere with the recipient's job performance." 
DAIL A. NEUGARTEN & JAY M. S H A F R ~ ,   SEXUAL^ IN ORGANIZATIONS: ROMANTIC 
AND COERCIVE BEHAVIORS AT WORK 3 (1980) (citation omitted). 
These definitions seem fairly clear: unwanted or unwelcome gender-based con- 
duct that disturbs the receiver in some way is harassment. The problem is that 
the conduct, while offensive to the recipient, may seem entirely innocuous to the 
offender. See id. 
20. Guidelines, supra note 16, § 1604.11(a)(3). 
21. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 I?. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991); 
see also MICHELE A. PALUDI & RICHARD B. BARICKMAN, ACADEMIC AND WORKPLACE 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT 6 (1991). 
22. EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 4, 8 405:6682; see also Katz v. Dole, 709 
F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983). 
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The Guidelines instruct courts to  examine the "totality of 
the circumstances" to  determine hostility or "unwelcome- 
n e s ~ . ' ~ ~  Factors include the following: (1) whether the conduct 
was verbal, physical, or both; (2) whether the conduct was a 
one-time occurrence or repeated; (3) whether the conduct was 
hostile and patently offensive; (4) whether the alleged harasser 
was a co-worker or a supervisor; (5) whether others joined in 
perpetrating the harassment; and (6) whether the harassment 
was directed at more than one individual." According to  the 
Guidelines, courts should interpret the conduct "from the objec- 
tive standpoint of a 'reasonable person.' "25 
In 1983, the Eleventh Circuit followed the Guidelines and 
held that an employer violates Title VII by creating a "hostile 
environment": 
Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive envi- 
ronment for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary 
barrier to sexual equality at  the workplace that racial harass- 
ment is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement that a man 
or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the 
privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can be 
as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epi- 
t h e t ~ . ~ ~  
Other circuits also began to  follow the Guidelines, defining the 
types of conduct that would rise to the level of "hostile environ- 
ment" sexual harassment. For example, in Katz v. Dole, the 
Fourth Circuit held that an abundance of sexual slurs, insults, 
epithets, and innuendo created a hostile workplace.27 The 
plaintiff recovered even though she was not economically 
23. Guidelines, supra note 16, 5 1604.11(b). The investigators must determine 
whether the victim's conduct was consistent with her claim that the offending con- 
duct was not desired. A claimant's occasional use of sexually explicit language does 
not indicate that subsequent sexual advances by others are welcome, and her "gen- 
eral character or past behavior toward others has limited, if any, probative value." 
EEOC P o k y  Guidance, supra note 4, 5 405:6687. But cf. Gan v. Kepro Circuit 
Sys., 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 639 (E.D. Mo. 1982) (holding that a woman's 
sexually explicit conversation barred her from claiming that male co-workers' com- 
ments and conduct were unwelcome). 
24. EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 4, 5 405:6689. 
25. Id. The conduct must "substantially affect the work environment of a rea- 
sonable person" in order to be considered "hostile." Thus, Title VII is not a " be- 
hicle for vindicating the petty slights suffered by the hypersensitive.' " Id. (quoting 
Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780, 784 (E.D. Wis. 1984)). 
26. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982). 
27. Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983). 
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harmed.28 In Bundy u. Jackson, the D.C. Circuit deemed "hos- 
tile" a workplace in which sexual propositions and sexual in- 
timidation by supervisors was "standard operating proce- 
d~re . "~ '  In Kinney v. Dole,30 a male supervisor forcefully 
grabbed, twisted, and injured the arm of a female employee. 
Although the act was not sexual in any romantic or traditional 
sense, it was gender-based-an act of aggression by a male 
against a female. As such, the D.C. Circuit held that it was dis- 
criminatory and created an  offensive, abusive w~rkplace.~' 
C. The Supreme Court's Interpretation: 
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson 
In 1986, the first Title VII hostile environment case 
reached the United States Supreme Court. In Meritor Savings 
Bank v. Vin~on:~ the plaintiff alleged that her male supervi- 
sor "fondled her in front of other employees, . . . exposed him- 
self to her, and even forcibly raped her on several  occasion^."^^ 
The Court, after carefully analyzing the EEOC Guidelines, held 
that an employee can state a hostile environment claim if she 
is subject to (1) "'sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, 
[or] other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature'"54 
that is (2) "unwelcome" and (3) "hostile," i.e., "sufficiently severe 
or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of. . . employment and 
create an abusive working en~ironment."'~~ Under this test, 
the Court had no dmculty finding Ms. Vinson to be a victim of 
hostile environment sexual h a r a ~ s m e n t . ~ ~  Significantly, in  de- 
termining whether the conduct was sexual harassment, the 
Court followed the EEOC's guidance and scrutinized the con- 
duct from the perspective of a reasonable person. 
Meritor has become the touchstone in this area,37 but its 
28. Id. 
29. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
30. 765 F.2d 1129 @.C. Cir. 1985). 
31. Id. at  1138. 
32. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
33. Id. at 60. 
34. Id. at 65 (quoting 29 C.F.R. 5 1604.11(a) (1985)). 
35. Id. at  67 (emphasis added) (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 
897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)). 
36. Id. at  68. The fact that Ms. Vinson "voluntarily" submitted to much of the 
conduct (for fear of her job, as well as her safety) did not mean the conduct was 
"welcome." Id. at 67. 
37. The Supreme Court has, however, granted certiorari in a case that could 
potentially impact the Meritor holding. See Hanis v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 976 
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application has been problematic. Although its "test" is fairly 
straightforward, it has not completely resolved the issue for 
lower courts. Because the conduct in Meritor was so blatant, 
the Court could establish a fairly elevated threshold and still 
provide relief to Ms. Vinson. Consequently, conduct that is 
somewhat less egregious, yet still offensive, may not qualify as  
"hostile." 
The real problem lies much deeper. In applying the Meritor 
reasonable person standard, federal courts have moved further 
and further from considering the victim's perspective of the 
incidents. Instead, as the following section will analyze, by ne- 
glecting the victim's perspective, courts have furthered stereo- 
typical notions of acceptable male beha~ior.~'  
A. Meritor and its Progeny 
1.  The problems with the Meritor test 
Although the Meritor Court announced its intention to ad- 
here to the EEOC Guidelines, its test is arguably more rigid 
than the  guideline^.^^ For example, the Meritor test requires 
that conduct be "pervasive" or "severe" to constitute a viola- 
t i ~ n . ~ '  The EEOC standard, on the other hand, merely re- 
quires that the conduct be "unwelcome" and "ha[ve] the pur- 
pose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an  individual's 
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or of- 
fensive working environment.'"' The range of conduct which 
might be deemed offensive under the EEOC Guidelines is po- 
tentially much broader than that which would be actionable 
under Meritor ?2 
Additionally, the Court's use of the word "pervasive" de- 
notes that the conduct must be "difhsed throughout every part 
of" the workplace or be "prevalent or dominant."43 One in- 
F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992) (unpublished disposition), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3511 
(US. Mar. 1, 1993) (No. 92-1168). 
38. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991). 
39. See Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women's Experience us. Legal Defi- 
nitions, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 60 (1990). 
40. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67. 
41. Guidelines, supra note 16, 5 1604.11(a) (emphasis added). 
42. Pollack, supra note 39, at 59-61. 
43. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (16th ed. 1971) (defi- 
nitions of "pervade" and "pervasive"). 
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stance of "unwelcome" conduct would arguably not be action- 
able under Meritor. In one light, it may seem unreasonable to 
impose liability for one remark or action. But if that one in- 
stance offends and intimidates nonetheless, it also seems un- 
reasonable to not attach liability. As the Ninth Circuit ex- 
plains, a single offense can be just as "intimidating or hostile" 
as a continuing offense, especially because our culture and 
media have taught women to read such events as precursors to 
more violent acti0ns.4~ Even one incident of harassment is 
"unacceptable since it . . . require[s] women to act as subordi- 
n a t e [ ~ ] , " ~ ~  a clear example of Title VII-prohibited discrimina- 
tion. On balance, the pervasiveness of the conduct should affect 
only the type or amount of the remedy, not the finding of ha- 
rassment .46 
2. The results: The wreck in the wake of Meritor 
Subsequent decisions, purporting to follow Meritor, demon- 
strate that the reasonable person standard-as articulated by 
the EEOC and interpreted by the courts-is not as objective, 
helpful, or even gender-neutral as it  claims to be. 
a. The cases. In Chamberlin v. 101 Realty:" the claim- 
ant was faced with five overt instances of sexual conduct. The 
fust occurred while Mrs. Chamberlin was in her supervisor's 
car. He turned to her and said, "with a little half smile and 
very lustily,' that she had a 'good body.'"' Two weeks later, 
the plaintiff testified that the defendant 
"stepped up real close to me, like within a foot, almost to 
where we were touching shoulders, and he looked at me, 
started at my head and he looked all the way down to my 
toes and back up again, and then he said, almost in a whis- 
per, he said, 'You look good in tight jeans. It shows off your 
butt.' "49 
Defendant repeated this comment two weeks later. During two 
subsequent lunch appointments, the supervisor took 
Chamberlin's hands and said, "'I like my women with good 
44. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991). 
45. Pollack, supra note 39, at 61. 
46. Id. 
47. 915 F.2d 777 (1st Cir. 1990). 
48. Id. at 780. 
49. Id. 
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looks and brains,' " and " 'My women are special. I like to put 
them on a pedestal."'50 Mrs. Chamberlin testified that she 
physically resisted each of these  advance^.^' Although she had 
received excellent work reviews to that point, she was soon 
fired. 
Although the supervisor's actions constituted quid pro quo 
harassment, the First Circuit held that they did not create a 
hostile environment. In fact, under the Meritor test, the court 
"consider[ed] it highly doubtful . . . that the sexual advances 
made to Charnberlin in [those] circumstances, without more, 
could be considered sufEciently 'severe or pervasive' to support 
a sexual discrimination claim of the hostile environment 
variety."52 
In Scott u. Sears, Roebuck & Co.," the plaintiff was re- 
peatedly propositioned by her supervisor, slapped on the but- 
tocks by co-workers, and subjected to vulgar and demeaning 
sexual comments? In holding that the conduct did not consti- 
tute sexual harassment, the Seventh Circuit noted that the 
central issue was whether "the demeaning conduct and sexual 
stereotyping cause[d] such anxiety and debilitation to the plain- 
tiff that the working conditions were 'poisoned' within the 
meaning of Title VII."55 The court held that the actions in this 
case did not create such anxiety and deb i l i t a t i~n .~~  
In Rabidue u. Osceola Refining Co.?' the plaintiff worked 
in an environment littered with pornography and polluted with 
crude and demeaning sexual epithets. Some male co-workers 
referred to her, not by her given name, but rather by slang ref- 
erences to the female anatomy.58 Surprisingly, the Sixth Cir- 
cuit held that the offensive posters and the vulgar comments 
"were not so startling to have affected seriously the psyches of 
the plaintiff or other female employees."59 
Id. 
Id. at 780. 
Id. at 783. 
798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986). 
Id. at 211-12. 
Id. at 213. 
Id. at 213-14. 
805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986). 
Id. at 624 (Keith, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
805 F.2d at 622. 
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b. The results. Title VII adjudication seems to have tak- 
en a wrong turn. These cases present facts that arguably dic- 
tate findings of hostile environment sexual harassment. Yet the 
plaintiffs were denied recovery on their claims, and new judi- 
cial "tests" were created that are more stringent than the 
Meritor test. The Scott test ("anxiety and debilitation sufficient 
to poison the workplace"), the Rabidue test ("seriously affect 
the psychological well being"), and the Chamberlin test ("per- 
vasiveness") are errant departures from the EEOCs guiding 
language. 
The circuit courts did follow the EEOC instructions to the 
extent that they viewed the "totality of the circumstances" 
through the eyes of a "reasonable person," but they generally 
failed to "consider the victim's perspective2'-the perspective of 
a reasonable woman. By neglecting the victim's perspective and 
choosing not to look through a woman's eyes, the courts un- 
knowingly furthered stereotypes of acceptable male behavior. 
Had the courts attempted to see the circumstances through the 
eyes of a reasonable woman, instead of a gender-neutral "per- 
son," the judicial tests might have been less rigorous, the 
thresholds lower, and the outcomes more equitable. 
B. The Adoption of the Reasonable Woman Standard 
In Ellison v. Brady, the Ninth Circuit applied the reason- 
able woman standard in a sexual harassment hostile environ- 
ment case. The offending conduct in Ellison was less overtly 
"hostile" than that in other cases; yet even in its subtlety, the 
conduct was offensive to its victim. The offensive behavior be- 
gan two years after Kerry Ellison and Sterling Gray began 
working for the Internal Revenue Service in 1984. In 1986, 
Gray began paying a great deal of attention to Ellison, "hang- 
ing around" her desk and extending frequent lunch invitations. 
Ellison accepted one such invitation but declined two subse- 
quent o f f e d l  Shortly after her refusals, Gray wrote her a 
note, stating, "I cried over you last night and I'm totally 
drained today. I have never been in such constant term oil [sic]. 
Thank you for talking with me. I could not stand to feel your 
60. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991). 
61. Id. at 873-74. 
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hatred for another day.'"2 When she read the note, Ellison 
became "shocked and frightened and left the room."63 Gray fol- 
lowed her, demanding that she talk to  him. Ellison left the 
building and went home. 
The next week, Ellison began a four-week training pro- 
gram in St. Louis. From California, Gray mailed her a three- 
page, single-spaced, typed letter which she described as much 
"weirder'' than the previous note.M In reaction to this letter, 
she explained: "I just thought he was crazy. I thought he was 
nuts. I didn't know what he would do next. I was fright- 
ened."65 
Ellison eventually filed a sexual harassment claim in 1987. 
After several administrative hearings, a district court granted 
the employer's motion for summary judgment on the grounds 
that Gray's conduct was neither severe nor pervasive enough to 
create a hostile en~ironment.~~ 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court's 
decision, holding that a "female plaintiff states a prima facie 
case of hostile environment sexual harassment when she alleg- 
es conduct which a reasonable woman would consider suffi- 
ciently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employ- 
ment and create an abusive working environment."' The 
court then concluded that a reasonable woman in Ellison's 
situation would have considered Gray's conduct sufficiently 
severe and pervasive to create a hostile en~ironrnent.~~ 
C. Why the Reasonable Woman Standard 
The Ninth Circuit responded to the confusion and judicial 
inconsistency in this arena by adopting the reasonable woman 
standard. The following analysis demonstrates why the reason- 
62. Id. at 874. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. Parts of the letter read: 
"I have enjoyed you so much over these past few months. Watching you. 
Experiencing you from 0 so far away." 
"I am obligated to you so much that if you want me to leave you alone I 
will . . . . If you want me to forget you entirely, I can not [sic] do that." 
Id. at 874 & n.1. 
65. Id. at 874. 
66. Id. at 875. 
67. Id. at 879 (emphasis added). 
68. Id. at 880. 
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able woman standard is a fairer, more logical, more consistent 
approach than the reasonable person standard. 
1. The EEOCs reasonable person is really a reasonable 
woman 
The EEOC has clarified the reasonable person standard, 
stating that courts " 'should consider the victim's perspective 
and not stereotyped notions of acceptable behavior.' "' At no 
point do the regulations or Guidelines indicate that the "per- 
son" part of the standard requires a strictly gender-neutral per- 
spective. In cases in which the victim is a woman, the "reason- 
able" perspective should also be that of a woman. 
The Guidelines focus more on the concept of objectivity 
than on gender neutrality. An objective standard maintains 
some semblance of conformity to social norms7' and deters 
abuse of the system by either unstable plaintiffs or those seek- 
ing an unjust ~indfall.~'  Courts have found that "Title VII 
does not serve as a vehicle for vindicating the petty slights 
suffered by the hypersensitive."" Consequently, the "reason- 
ableness" or objective part of the standard allows both plaintiffs 
and employers to begin on a common ground. 
The EEOC instructs courts to consider both the "victim's 
perspective" and the "context in which the alleged harassment 
took place,"" arguably guiding courts to  use a gender-oriented 
perspective. For example, the EEOC "believes that a workplace 
in which sexual slurs, displays of 'girlie' pictures, and other 
offensive conduct abound can constitute a hostile work environ- 
ment even if many people deem it to be harmless or insignifi- 
cant."74 In several cases, both women and men have been sub- 
-jetted to such environments. The men, however, considered it 
harmless, while the women were offended.75 Thus, the EEOC 
anticipated that courts would look beyond "male,'' or even gen- 
69. EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 4, 4 405:6690. 
70. See Abrams, supm note 3, at 1210. 
71. One woman stated her opinion that many working women use sexual ploys 
to move ahead politically in the workplace. If their designs go awry, they quickly 
claim sexual harassment. Interview with former employee (anonymous) of First 
Interstate Bank of California, in Provo, Utah (Nov. 20, 1992). 
72. Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Wis. 1984). 
73. EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 4, 5 405:6690. 
74. Id. (emphasis added). 
75. See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. 
Fla. 1991). 
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der-neutral, labels of "harmless or insignificant" and focus in- 
stead on how the environment affects the victim. If the victim 
is a woman, the court should scrutinize the working environ- 
ment through her eyes. To maintain the fairness contemplated 
by the word "reasonable," that  scrutiny should. be tempered by 
an objective notion of how other "reasonable" women would 
react to the environment. 
2. Differing perspec f iues 
Women see sexual conduct in the workplace differently 
than men, and the Ninth Circuit found this argument to be 
persuasive in adopting the reasonable woman ~tandard .?~  The 
Ellison court opined that Sterling Gray could have seen his 
conduct as that of a modern-day Cyrano de Bergerac, wooing 
his lady through desperate, unrequited letters.?? Many "rea- 
sonable" men might consider Gray's actions to be merely harm- 
less flirtation and Ellison's resistance to be merely a typical 
reaction in the courtship ritual. Ms. Ellison, however, was not 
so inclined. To her, Gray's actions were neither harmless nor 
trivial; in fact, she testified that  the correspondence frightened 
her and made her concerned for her safety.?' 
Empirical data and scholarly commentary support the con- 
clusion that Ellison's reaction was perfectly rational for a rea- 
sonable woman. In fact, even seemingly minor sexual overtures 
can generate tremendous fear of greater harm.7g Women's 
"physical and social vulnerability to sexual coercion can make 
them wary of sexual  encounter^."'^ Upon receipt of Gray's 
"love notes," Ellison could have easily conjured up imag- 
es-readily supplied by modern media-of stalkers and imbal- 
76. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Yates v. 
Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 n.2 (6th Cir. 1987) ("We acknowledge that men and 
women are vulnerable in different ways and offended by different behavior."); 
Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990); Lipsett v. Univer- 
sity of P.R., 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 
611 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
Feminist scholars have also argued that women see world experiences different- 
ly than men. See, e.g., Jeanne L. Schroeder, Abduction from the Seraglio: Feminist 
Methodologies and the Logic of Imagination, 70 TEX. L. REV. 109, 122-24 (1991) 
(explaining "different voice feminism"). See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIF- 
FERENT VOICE (1990). 
77. 924 F.2d a t  880. 
78. Id. at  873-74. 
79. Abrams, supra note 3, at  1205; see also Ellison, 924 F.2d at 880-81. 
80. Abrams, supra note 3, at b W .  
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anced sociopaths whose nightmarish pursuits have begun with 
a "harmless" letter." Her fears were entirely reasonable from 
that perspective. 
Most men, on the other hand, may not think that this type 
of conduct is offensive at all. In her research of sexual harass- 
ment and its effects, Barbara Gutek has concluded that men 
are not as sensitized as women to sexual conduct in the 
workplace. In one study, she presented males and females with 
a series of "positive comments of a sexual nature," such as com- 
pliments, social invitations, or  expressions of admiration. 
Twenty-seven percent of the women respondents saw the com- 
ments as offensive, while only eleven percent of the men sur- 
veyed felt the comments were ~ffensive.'~ When presented 
with "negative comments of a sexual nature," such as slang 
terms, epithets, vulgarities, and direct sexual propositions or 
attacks, a larger percentage from both groups viewed the com- 
ments as offensive, but an alarming disparity still existed. Six- 
ty-three percent of the women were offended by the conduct 
and comments, while only forty-eight percent of the men were 
SO ~ffended.'~ 
In another study, Gutek found that sixty-seven percent of 
the men questioned would actually be flattered by a sexual 
proposition from a female co-w~rker .~  Of the women, on the 
other hand, less than seventeen percent would feel flattered by 
such an invitation, while almost sixty-three percent would be 
in~ulted.'~ The obvious conclusion of Gutek's research is that 
women are more likely than men to see sexual conduct as of- 
fensive, intimidating, threatening, or  fright ening-a phenome- 
non Gutek terms the "giant gender gap."" 
David Terpstra and Douglas Baker concur with Gutek's 
studies. They constructed a model that charts sexual harass- 
ment as a process, comparing "[blehaviors exhibited by harass- 
ers" to the "[b]ehaviors as perceived by harassees."'' The mod- 
81. One well-known example is that of John KincMey Jr.'s infatuation with 
actress Jodie Foster. What began with "harmless" love letters resulted in a presi- 
dential assassination attempt and Ms. Foster's fear for her life. 
82. See VERONICA F. NIEVA & BARBARA . GUTEK, WOMEN AND WORK 63 (1981) 
(citing Gutek's 1980 West Coast worker survey). 
83. Id. 
84. See BARBARA . GTJTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE 96-97 (1985). 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Terpstra & Baker, supra note 2, at 179. 
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el allowed them to analyze the reactions of the victims and the 
long-term psychological effects of harassment? Based on 
their own studies, as well as those conducted by Gutek, the 
National Merit Systems Protection Board, and others, they 
concluded that "women perceive a wider range of socio-sexual 
behaviors to be sexual harassment than do men."89 Most par- 
ticipants agreed that behavior such as sexual assault, proposi- 
tions, physical contact, and offensive remarks directed toward 
a n  individual constituted haras~rnent.~' However, less than a 
consensus existed on whether behaviors such as compliments, 
coarse language, jokes, and 'looks'' were haras~ing.~'  In an- 
swering whether a particular comment or episode of conduct 
was harassment, the respondent's gender proved to be the most 
influential variable; women were more likely than men to per- 
ceive certain conduct as harassing or offensive.g2 
These studies demonstrate that women generally have a 
heightened awareness and reaction to sexual conduct directed 
towards them in the workplace.g3 Perhaps a model will clanfy: 
Clearly Not Point 1 Point 2 Clearly 
Harassment Reasonable Woman Reasonable Man Harassment 
INCREASING HOSTILITY --- --- ----------- b 
This model represents a spectrum of gender-based conduct in 
the workplace. On the far left is conduct that theoretically no 
one would consider offensive, such as a completely professional 
handshake or greeting, void of any overtones. On the far right 
is conduct that theoretically everyone should consider offensive 
or hostile, such as rape. At Point 1, the conduct begins to of- 
fend the reasonable woman. The reasonable male statistically 
is not offended until Point 2, somewhere further along the scale 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 186. 
90. Id. at 188. 
91. Id. at 189. 
92. Id. at 186. 
93. Perhaps part of the problem is the fact that women tend to see their jobs 
as marginalized and precarious to begin with. See MACKINNON, supra note 19, at 
15. Thus, any sort of sexual conduct from a man in "power" over her job is threat- 
ening and confusing. Id. at 1-7. 
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of hostility. Because the reasonable person standard only pro- 
hibits conduct that both sexes agree is hostile or offensive, the 
conduct falling between Point 1 and Point 2 will go unpun- 
ished, forcing reasonable women to endure conduct that offends 
them. 
3. The judicial reasonable person has really been a reasonable 
man 
Because men and women see sexual conduct differently, a 
gender-neutral standard that allows a trier of fact to see both 
sides of the issue at once is impossible to achieve. Applying 
Gutek's research, a reasonable woman would likely view Gray's 
conduct in Ellison as harassment, while a "reasonable man" 
probably would noteg4 When courts use the reasonable person 
standard, they attempt to "step into the shoes" of a completely 
objective, gender-neutral person, without giving weight to the 
biases of either sex. Although this approach may arguably be 
possible in theory, it is not possible in practice; if no gender- 
neutral person exists, its viewpoint cannot exist either. Each 
trier of fact is inevitably forced to decide if the reasonable 
person's perspective is that of a reasonable man or a reason- 
able woman. I t  is disingenuous to assume the trier of fact can 
somehow find the "middle of the road." 
Some commentators argue that triers of fact, when apply- 
ing the reasonable person standard, will choose the male per- 
spective by default. For example, Kathryn Abrams asserts that 
because our society is based on a gender hierarchy, male views 
dominate the reasonable person ~tandard.9~ Similarly, Nancy 
Ehrenreich argues that the reasonable person standard neu- 
tralizes the search for diversity and pluralism and makes all 
experience conform to the dominant male e~perience.'~ Cath- 
arine MacKinnon also posits that the "core of the legal prohibi- 
tion" of sexual harassment is based on a "male vision" of 
women's  experience^.^? 
The Ninth Circuit asserts in Ellison that the reasonable 
94. See GUTEK, supra note 84, at 95-105. 
95. Abrams, supra note 3, at 1206 n.103. 
96. Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of 
Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1218 (1990); see 
also Peter Linzer & Patricia A. Tidwell, Letter to David Dow-Friendly Critic and 
Critical Friend, 28 HOUSTON L. REV. 861, 862 (1991) ("[Tlhe concept of reasonable- 
ness rarely includes points of view outside the main stream.?. 
97. MACKINNON, supra note 19, at 26. 
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"person" standard has ignored the experiences and perceptions 
of women and instead has ratified "male-biased" stereotypes?' 
In his dissent in Rabidue, Judge Keith argues that the reason- 
able person standard fails to  account for differences between 
the views of most women and men regarding appropriate sexu- 
al conduct.99 In Harris v. International Paper Co.,lO' the 
court asserts that the reasonable person standard is contrary to 
the directives of the EEOC Guidelines because it supports 
traditional notions of reasonable behavior established by the of- 
fenders.''' The inevitable conclusion is that a purely gender- 
neutral perspective is a dangerous and unfair legal fiction. 
Such a standard, unfortunately, has only been a proxy for the 
male point of view.lo2 
D. The Arguments Against the Reasonable Woman Standard 
In his dissent in Ellison v. Brady,lo3 Judge Stephens 
98. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); see, e.g., Hall v. Gus 
Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988) (suggesting that sexual innuendo, vulgar 
language, and pornography are simply stronger forms of "rough manners"); Rabidue 
v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 621 (6th Cir. 1986) (explaining that Title VII is 
not a "cure-all" designed to eliminate all problems in the workplace or to work 
some "magical transformation" of the working environment); cf: Abrams, supra note 
3, at 1201 (arguing that this type of reasoning reflects an "almost amused toler- 
ance that reflects no awareness of how female plaintiffs might perceive these af- 
fronts"); Pollack, supra note 39, at  67 (noting that much of the harassing behavior 
occurring in the workplace is tolerated by courts as a male prerogative). 
99. Rabcdue, 805 F.2d a t  626 (Keith, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
(citing Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title 
VII, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1451 (1984)). 
100. 765 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Me. 1991). 
101. Id. at  1513 (citing Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 
1988)); cf. EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 4, $ 405:6690 ("The reasonable per- 
son standard should consider the victim's perspective and not stereotyped notions 
of acceptable behavior."). 
102. Another possible argument against the reasonable person standard is that it 
frustrates the underlying theory and purpose of Title VII. The statute was original- 
ly invoked in hostile environment cases because sexual harassment was seen as 
discriminatory-a woman was treated differently because of her sex. See Henson v. 
City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982); Rabidue, 805 F.2d a t  620. 
Arguably, the reasonable person standard requires the trier of f ad  to attempt to 
view the offending conduct from the perspective of both sexes. Thus, any conduct 
which is deemed offensive under this analysis would not technically be discrimina- 
tory, and Title VII would not apply. The reasonable woman or victim standard, on 
the other hand, allows the court to better understand how the offending conduct 
was perceived by the victim. The court can then punish conduct, not simply be- 
cause it treats one gender differently than another, but because it treats one indi- 
vidual differently because of gender. 
103. 924 F.2d 872, 884 (9th Cir. 1991) (Stephens, J., dissenting). 
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summarizes several arguments against the new standard. He 
states that the reasonable woman standard is "ambiguous and 
therefore inadequate."lo4 Consequently, he argues, the "gen- 
der neutral standard would greatly contribute to the clarity of 
this and future cases in the same area."lo5 
Judge Stephens also argues that "[a] man's response to 
circumstances faced by women and their effect upon women 
can be and in given circumstances may be expected to be un- 
derstood by men."lo6 He criticizes the majority's "assumption" 
that "men's eyes do not see what a woman sees through her 
eyes."lo7 However, Judge Stephens's "ass~mption'~ that men 
and women see sexual conduct in the workplace in the same 
light is directly contradicted by empirical data. The Gutek and 
TerpstraBaker studies show that men and women do not see 
sexual conduct in the workplace in the same way. What may be 
highly offensive to a woman might be considered harmless by a 
male co-worker.lo8 
The studies indicate that more of a consensus exists on the 
major offenses; men and women are more likely to agree that 
certain egregious types of sexual conduct, such as assault, rape, 
and violence, constitute harassment.lo9 However, Title VII ju- 
risprudence is not merely concerned with the most egregious 
offenses; it is equally concerned with eliminating all traces of 
di~crimination.~'~ If sexually oriented jokes, comments, ges- 
tures, and "sienerf are offensive to the average female worker, 
a hostile environment exists. Even if men would generally 
consider the conduct harmless, the court should defer to the 
reasonable woman's view. 
E. Alternatives to the Reasonable Woman Standard 
1. The gender-neutral approach 
Judge Stephens argues that the reasonable person stan- 
dard affords better protection to everyone because of its gender 
neutrality. The judge is concerned that if a male were to bring 





108. See supra notes 76-93 and accompanying text. 
109. See supra text accompanying note 90. 
110. Cf. supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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may not "meet [his] needs.""' However, the Ellison majority 
addressed that issue: "Of course, where male employees allege 
that co-workers engage in conduct which creates a hostile envi- 
ronment, the appropriate victim's perspective would be that of 
a reasonable man."'" Thus, the perspective is really that of a 
reasonable person of the victim's gender.ll3 Because Ellison 
and the vast majority of cases involve women, the court chose 
simply to emphasize a woman's perspective. 
2. The subjective "prima facie" approach 
Some commentators argue that although the reasonable 
woman standard is a good step, the ideal approach is a com- 
pletely subjective standard.'14 Under such a rubric, each 
claim of harassment would create a rebuttable presumption of 
a Title VII violation. First, the claimant states a prima facie 
hostile environment case simply by pleading that the conduct 
was unwelcome and offended her. To rebut the presumption of 
a Title VII violation, the defendant then has the burden to 
prove that the plaintiff was idiosyncratic. The plaintiff can then 
counter by proving either that she is not idiosyncratic or that  
the defendant "exploited" her idiosyncracy. 
Although this subjective standard focuses on the victim's 
perspective and would provide an initial advantage to claim- 
ants, such an approach arguably places an onerous economic 
burden on employers. To demonstrate, a woman employee 
could allege she was offended by a male co-worker's smile, and 
that allegation alone would establish a prima facie case. The 
employer would then have the difficult task of proving that the 
claimant's idiosyncracy revolves, around her paranoid belief 
that each smile is actually a perverse and lecherous sneer, that  
each look is one of lust. If the defendant were unsuccessful, or 
if the claimant could prove that the defendant knew of her 
uniqueness and "exploited" i t  by smiling at  her, then she would 
win. Under such an approach, the litigation costs of Title VII 
would become too extreme. The inevitable economic conse- 
quences would be lost profits and fewer employees. Balance, 
111. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 884 (9th Cir. 1991) (Stephens, J., dissent- 
ing). 
112. 924 F.2d at 879 all. 
113. See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 627 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, 
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
114. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 3, at 1209 & n.110. 
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therefore, is crucial: though the aim of Title VII is to protect 
victimized employees, i t  is also important to protect employers 
from potentially meritless litigation. 
Analytically, the subjective standard does not provide wom- 
en with any greater consideration or protection than does the 
reasonable woman standard. In fact, the reasonable woman 
standard will arguably produce the same positive results for 
reasonable claimants without placing an undue burden on em- 
ployers to defend frivolous litigation. Under the subjective ap- 
proach, a court would engage in a comparison very similar to 
the objective standard; in order to evaluate the claimant's "idio- 
syncracy," the court would have to judge her against an objec- 
tive, reasonable woman standard. Why not begin the analysis 
at that point? Proving the claimant is "reasonable" is no differ- 
ent than proving she is "not idiosyncratic." In fact, proving a 
positive may be even less burdensome on the claimant. As the 
Ellison court points out, the reasonable woman standard is de- 
signed to safeguard against the "idiosyncratic concerns of the 
rare hyper-sensitive empl~yee ," '~~  while still providing 
heightened sensitivity to women's concerns. Thus, an objective 
standard satisfies the concerns expressed by the commentators, 
while providing an  economic balance for all parties. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Analyzing hostile environment claims through the eyes of a 
reasonable woman accurately reflects and fulfills the 
antidiscrimination designs of Title VII. That standard, as op- 
posed to a gender-neutral reasonable person standard or an 
individualized subjective standard, will arguably provide better 
judicial protection for those who have suffered the humiliation 
of sexual harassment in the workplace. 
Adoption of the reasonable woman standard is the most 
effective way for courts to gain a clearer understanding of what 
conduct offends the victims of sexual harassment, and it will 
significantly enhance courts' ability to eradicate sexually ha- 
rassing conduct.'" Courts have already begun to follow 
Ellison.117 In Harris v. International Paper Co., for example, 
115. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879. 
116. Employers have a vested interest in eliminating sexual harassment from 
their work environments. In addition to saving the costs of defending lawsuits, 
studies have demonstrated that reduction of sexual harassment increases morale, 
productivity, and profits. See Mathews, supra note 7, at 308. 
117. See, e.g., Stingley v. Arizona, 796 F. Supp. 424 (D. Ariz. 1992); Harris v. 
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the theoretical underpinnings of the standard were aptly sum- 
marized: "Since the concern of Title VII is to redress effects on 
victims, the fact-finder must 'walk a mile in the victim's shoes' 
to understand those effects . . . ."118 
David L. Pinkston 
International Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Me. 1991). 
118. Harris, 765 F. Supp. a t  1516. 
